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IN DEFENCE OF A PERSPECTIVAL SEMANTICS FOR 'KNOW'

Berit Brogaard

Relativism offers an ingenious way of accommodating most of our intuitions about 'know': the truth-value of sentences containing 'know' is a function of parameters determined by a context of use *and* a context of assessment. This sort of double-indexing provides a more adequate account of the linguistic data involving 'know' than does standard contextualism. However, relativism has come under recent attack: it supposedly cannot account for the factivity of 'know', and it entails, counterintuitively, that circumstances of evaluation have features that cannot be shifted by any intensional operator. I offer replies to these objections on behalf of the relativist. I then argue that a version of contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds.

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Contextualists of a traditional bent treat 'know' as expressing different knowledge relations in different contexts of use [Cohen 1987; DeRose 1995; Lewis 1996]. Such a treatment is partially supported by linguistic data: we tend to assign different truth-conditions to one and the same knowledge ascription in different contexts. The treatment is only partially supported by the data, because there is another kind of data which contextualists have trouble accommodating. We often act as if the standards for 'know' are context-invariant: if reminded of a discrepancy in our knowledge ascriptions owing to a context-shift, we will hesitate to say things like 'what I said was merely that I met the standards for ''know'' that were in place when I was making the earlier claim'. Instead we will say: 'I was wrong. I thought I knew back then, but I didn't' [MacFarlane 2005a]. This sort of evidence provides a compelling case against contextualism.

Relativism offers an ingenious way of accommodating most of our intuitions about 'know' [Richard 2004; MacFarlane 2005a; MacFarlane 2005b; see also Kölbel 2002; Kölbel 2003, Kölbel forthcoming]: the truth-value of sentences containing 'know' is a function of parameters determined by a context of use *and* a context of assessment. This sort of double-indexing explains the retraction data as well as other troubling evidence. However, relativism has come under recent attack: it supposedly cannot account for the factivity of 'know', and it entails, counterintuitively, that circumstances of evaluation have features that cannot be shifted by any intensional operator. I offer replies to these objections on behalf of the relativist. I then argue that relativism is not needed to account for the problematic data.

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I conclude by defending a version of non-indexical contextualism that explains the problematic data without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment.[1]

I hasten to say that my primary concern here is with the empirical adequacy of *semantic* explanations of the evidence. I shall not be concerned with the question of whether my theory does a better job accounting for the presented data than theories that propose to explain contextual variability on pragmatic grounds.

I. The Case Against Contextualism

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Contextualists of a traditional bent model the semantics of 'know' on the standard theory of indexicals.[2] On the standard theory, the content of an indexical depends on some parameter of the context of use. For instance, the content of 'I' depends on a speaker parameter, and the content of 'now' depends on a time parameter. The standard parameters of the context of use are a world, a speaker, an addressee, a time, and a location. Following David Kaplan [1989], any sequence of these features is a context of use. Besides fixing the semantic values of indexicals the context of use determines a default circumstance of evaluation. The default circumstance of evaluation is the world and time of the context of use.[3] However, circumstance-shifting operators such as 'it is possible that' and 'it has been the case that' shift the parameters of the circumstance with respect to which the content they operate on is evaluated. In the case of 'it has been that there are dinosaurs', for example, the past-tense operator 'it has been that' shifts the time t determined by the context of use to some time t* such that t* is earlier than t.

Traditional contextualists treat 'know' as an indexical. The content of 'know', they say, depends on the epistemic standards salient in the conversational context. 'Know' expresses different knowledge relations relative to different epistemic standards. For the traditional theory of indexicals to apply here, the sequence of contextual parameters must be taken to include an epistemic standard parameter. This adjustment to the traditional theory is rather innocent. It is widely agreed that a similar adjustment is required in order to account for the context-sensitivity of gradable adjectives like 'tall' and 'flat'. The content of 'tall', for instance, depends on the tallness standards salient in the conversational context.[4] The traditional contextualist semantics for 'know' is thus relatively uncontroversial, semantically speaking. What is at the centre of the perennial dispute about the adequacy of contextualism is whether this kind of contextual semantics is empirically adequate. Among the pieces of evidence that have

[1]The term 'nonindexical contextualism' is John MacFarlane's [2007; forthcoming].
[2]I shall use the term 'indexical' loosely to mean an expression whose content varies with context.
[3]And perhaps also the location and standards of precision. I shall ignore the location and standards of precision parameters in what follows. Moreover, I shall assume that it is uncontroversial to include a time parameter in the circumstance of evaluation. But see King [2003].
[4]The tallness standard salient in the conversational context is sometimes determined by the (near-) linguistic environment, as in 'He is a tall basketball player' [Stanley 2002; 2004].

been given to undermine the traditional contextualist account are the following two.[5]

The Retraction Problem
Normally I am perfectly happy to say 'I know that my car is in the driveway'.[6] But on one occasion I am particularly obsessed with the possibility that a car thief might have stolen my car. The following exchange transpires between you and me:

Me: ... So, you see, I don't know that my car is in the driveway.
You: But a few hours ago you said that you knew it was there.
Me: I was wrong. I didn't know that it was in the driveway back then either.

If I meant different things by 'know' on the two occasions, as contextualism predicts, we should expect me to respond differently, for instance, with 'Yes, but I was right back then as well. It's just that the conversational standards have changed' or 'Yes, but I was right back then as well. I just didn't mean the same thing by "know"'.

The Problem of Belief Reports
At 10 a.m. John parks his car in his driveway and takes the subway to work. A couple of hours later I overhear John say that he knows his car is in the driveway. I report this as follows:

(1) John believes he knows that his car is in the driveway.

I am the speaker of (1). So contextualism predicts that the content of 'know' depends on the standards in play in my context. So (1) represents John as believing at noon that he knows, by my standards, that his car is in the driveway. But intuitively, this is not what John believes [Cappelen and Lepore 2003; Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson 2004].

Contextualists have developed a number of strategies to explain away problems of this sort [DeRose 2004; DeRose 2006]. Keith DeRose [2006], for instance, argues that we can handle the retraction problem by appealing to semantic blindness: I retract my earlier knowledge ascriptions but not, say, my earlier tallness or "here-ness" ascriptions because I am ignorant of the fact that 'know' is context-sensitive but not ignorant of the fact that 'tall' or 'here' is.

DeRose thinks that semantic blindness is not required in order to do away with the problem of belief reports. He admits that we are quick to disquote in the case of 'know', but this is not a problem for the contextualist, he says, for we are equally quick to disquote in the case of other context-sensitive expressions. If, in passing, we overhear John say 'Michael Jordan is tall', we might report this as: 'John believes that Michael Jordan is tall'.

[5]Versions of these problems can be found in Schiffer [1996]; Rysiew [2001]; Cappelen and Lepore [2003; 2005]; Hawthorne [2003: chap. 2]; MacFarlane [2005a], Richard [2004]. Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson [2004] present analogous problems for contextualism about 'might'. Stanley [2004; 2005] presents additional problem for contextualism about 'know'. Both Ludlow [2005] and Halliday [2007] respond to Stanley's objections.
[6]This example is borrowed from MacFarlane [2005a].

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Of course, if we are aware that the standards in play in John's conversational context are different from those in play in our own, we will hesitate to disquote without a follow-up, for instance, 'but John does not believe Jordan is tall for an NBA player'. But, says DeRose, we also hesitate to disquote without a follow-up in the case of 'know'. Suppose I am in a 'high standards' context, and the question arises whether Louise, who I know is in a 'low standards' context, thinks she knows that John was in his office yesterday. I will then hesitate to say, 'Yes, she believes she knows John was in' without a follow-up.

DeRose's reply does indeed seem to smooth out the differences between the semantic behaviour of 'know' or other context-sensitive expressions. But there is a further problem, which I think DeRose cannot sidestep as easily. The problem is that the case of 'know' calls for a different kind of follow-up. If I am aware that the standards in John's conversational context are lower than the standards in mine, I might say 'John believes Jordan is tall. But he doesn't believe he is tall for an NBA player', but I will not say 'John believes that Jordan is tall. But he is wrong'. The case of 'know' is different. If a police officer is questioning me about John's whereabouts, and he wants to know whether Louise thinks she knows, I might say, 'She believes she knows. But she is wrong', but I will not say, 'She believes she knows, but she doesn't believe she knows by *our* high standards'. So it seems that the contextualist is required to appeal to semantic blindness here as well.

DeRose is aware that the semantic blindness move might strike some as a bit too easy. He replies that he is not worried; for if 'know' is context-insensitive, then we are semantically blind to its insensitivity [DeRose 2006]. So, invariantists too must posit a thoroughgoing semantic blindness.

This reply seems adequate if made in response to a worried invariantist. But it is not adequate if there is a better theory on the market which can explain the apparent contextual variability of 'know' *and* solve the retraction and belief report problems. Relativists claim to have such a theory on offer. I turn to that next.

II. Relativism

Where contextualists hold that the truth-value of sentences containing 'know' varies with the standards in play in the context of use, relativists think it varies with the standards in play in the context of use *and* a context of assessment. A context of assessment is 'a situation in which a (past, present, or future, actual or merely possible) utterance of a sentence might be assessed for truth or falsity' [MacFarlane 2005a: 18]. Suppose John, who does indeed have hands, and whose perceptual and cognitive faculties are in full working order, says: 'I know I have hands'. According to the contextualist, the truth-value of John's assertion will depend on the standards in play in John's (the speaker's) context. What anyone else has to say about John's assertion cannot affect its truth-value. So, if the standards in play in John's context are fairly lax, then John's assertion is true. Relativists complicate this picture. John's assertion will have different

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truth-values depending on who considers it. It might be true relative to the standards in play in your context but false relative to the standards in play in mine.

Relativists distinguish content-relativism from truth-relativism [Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson 2004; MacFarlane 2005a]. Content relativism is the view that the content of a sentence containing 'know' depends on the standards in play in the context of assessment and the context of use. In the case of 'I know I have hands' the semantic value of 'I' depends on who is uttering the sentence, and the semantic value of 'know' depends on who is considering the sentence. Given content relativism there is no fact of the matter as to what has been said on a given occasion. If I utter 'I know my car is parked in the driveway' what I said will depend on who happens to consider it. Of course, if I consider it (which the relativists think I do when I utter it), then relative to my context of use and my context of assessment, the sentence has a semantic value. But in other contexts of assessment, the sentence as uttered by me has a different semantic value. Relativists say that they are not sure what to make of this view [MacFarlane 2005a; MacFarlane 2005b; see, however, Weatherson (forthcoming)]. So I will quickly move on to truth-relativism.

Truth-relativism is the view that 'know' has the same semantic value in any context of use and any context of assessment. Thus, if we ignore indexicals such as 'I' or 'now', a sentence containing 'know' will express the same proposition in any context of use and any context of assessment, but the truth-value of the proposition expressed will depend on the standards in play in the context of assessment. Truth-relativists thus give up on the Fregean thesis that the truth-value of propositions is relative only to possible worlds [Stanley 2005: chap. 7; Stanley manuscript; for intriguing discussion of these issues see also Glanzberg (forthcoming)]. The Fregean thesis has already been rejected by those who admit temporal propositions, i.e., propositions that can change their truth-value over time [Kaplan 1989].[7] But relativists go one step further: the truth-value of propositions is relative, not only to worlds and times, but also to standards of evaluation.

To make sense of this, relativists construe circumstances of evaluation as containing not only a time and a world parameter determined by the context of use, but also an epistemic standard parameter determined by the context of assessment. Circumstances at which propositions are assessed for truth are thus <world, time, epistemic standards> triples, where the world and time is the world and time of the context of use, and the standard is the standard in play in the context of assessment. For instance, if John asserts 'I have hands' at t in w, then John's assertion that he has hands will have different truth-values relative to different $<w, t, e_i>$ triples, where e_i is the epistemic standards in play in the context of someone who considers the sentence.

At first glance, relativism does better than contextualism. First, when the standards go up we tend to retract our earlier knowledge claims. We will say

[7]For ease of exposition I shall call temporal propositions, the semantic values of sentences, 'propositions', even if this terminology is not entirely happy.

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not only that we did not know earlier, but also that the earlier assertion was false. This is difficult for traditional contextualists to explain without appealing to semantic blindness; for if the truth-value of our earlier assertion is fixed by the context of use, and our earlier assertion was true, then we should expect it to be natural to say things like 'What I said earlier was true'. Relativism avoids this problem, because it takes knowledge claims to be true or false only relative to a context of assessment. So, if I am the one assessing the sentence, and my current standards are high, then my assertion of 'What I said earlier was true' is false.[8]

Second, because truth-relativists take the content of 'know' to be independent of both the context of use and the context of assessment, there is no problem in explaining why we do not hesitate to make belief reports involving 'know', as in:

(1) John believes that he knows that his car is in the driveway.

If the content of 'know' is context invariant, we should expect such belief reports to be unproblematic, as indeed they are. (1) does not represent John as holding the belief that he knows, by the speaker's standards, that his car is in the driveway. Nor does it represent John as holding the belief that he knows by his standards that his car is in the driveway; it simply represents John as holding the belief that he knows that his car is in the driveway.

III. The Case Against Relativism

Truth-relativism about 'know' is attractive because it allows us to explain the problematic data involving 'know' without appealing to semantic blindness. But it is a very radical view. Because it proposes to distinguish between *context of use* and *context of assessment*, it parts ways with traditional semantic theory. If relativism is right, then we can no longer say of a sentence-in-context that it has an absolute truth-value. Sentences-in-context have indefinitely many relative truth-values. Still, if relativism explains all of the problematic data, and no other competing view does, perhaps it is time to give up our old paradigms.

However, Jason Stanley has recently complained that relativism about 'know' does not explain all the problematic data (for discussion, see also Brogaard [forthcoming c]). The first problem that Stanley raises turns on the relativist assumption that circumstances of evaluation include an epistemic standard [Stanley manuscript: 7].[9] Stanley finds this assumption exceedingly odd. Normally, the parameters that go into the circumstance of evaluation are those that can be shifted by a circumstance-shifting operator. For example, the reason a time parameter is included in the circumstance (if it is) is that there are circumstance-shifting operators, such as 'it has been that' and 'sometimes', that can shift the time feature of the

[8]Object-language occurrences of 'true' and 'false' are treated as relative expressions as well.
[9]I have reversed the order of Stanley's objections, as I am going to use my reply to the first objection in my reply to the second.

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circumstance. But as no circumstance-shifting operator can shift the epistemic standards, it is implausible to think that the circumstances contain an epistemic standard parameter. Relativism is for that reason an implausible linguistic thesis.

However, I think the objection does not strike as hard as Stanley intends. Circumstance-shifters like 'it is possible that' and 'it has been that' do not shift the epistemic standard parameter. But this is not surprising. For circumstance-shifters are selective: they need not shift all the parameters of the circumstance of evaluation. 'It is possible that' shifts only the world parameter, and 'it has been that' shifts only the time parameter. The question then is whether there is any circumstance-shifter that operates on the epistemic standard parameter. It seems that there is. Mental state operators such as 'so-and-so believes that' seem to shift the epistemic standard parameter. Stanley considers this possibility, but thinks such operators are not 'linked to any notion of truth, relativist or otherwise' [Stanley manuscript: 7, ex 4].

But I think this is incorrect. For there is good reason to think that attitude verbs must be treated as operator-forming expressions which form mental state operators [Williamson 2000: chap. 1], and if they function in that way, then they are indeed linked to a notion of truth. Here is one sort of pressure towards treating attitude verbs as operator-forming expressions.[10] The proposition expressed by a sentence embedded in an attitude context may not be the exact content of any of the attitude holder's attitude states. Consider, for instance, 'Joe wants to smoke a cigarette', or more idiomatically:

(2) Joe wants that he smokes a cigarette.

Let us focus on the reading where 'a cigarette' takes narrow scope with respect to the mental state operator. On this reading, (2) ascribes to Joe a desire with the content of 'Joe smokes some cigarette or other'. But Joe's desire is not satisfied iff Joe smokes some cigarette or other [Fara 2003, Brogaard forthcoming c]. For, Joe has no desire to smoke a cigarette that has been floating in a glass of beer. Thus, we cannot take (2) to be true iff the content of the 'that' clause is the exact content of Joe's desire [Fara 2003: 157].[11] If, however, we treat the attitude verb as an operator-forming expression, then we get the right result. (2) is true at the actual world iff *Joe smokes a cigarette* is true at all worlds compatible with the exact content of Joe's actual desire.[12] As several authors have pointed out, similar considerations can be used to motivate an account of other attitude verbs

[10]Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

[11]Fara's point can be simplified as follows. 'Joe wants that Q', and 'P entails Q', does not imply 'Joe wants that P'. So, 'Joe wants that Joe smokes a cigarette', and "Joe smokes a soiled cigarette" entails "Joe smokes a cigarette" does *not* entail 'Joe wants that Joe smokes a soiled cigarette'. But if the content of 'Joe smokes a cigarette' were the exact content of Joe's desire, then Joe's desire would be satisfied in all situations in which he smokes a cigarette. Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

[12]Of course, a world cannot be a metaphysically possible world, as Joe might desire something that is metaphysically inconsistent. However, the worlds in question need not be construed as metaphysically possible worlds [Chalmers manuscript b].

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such as 'believe' as operator-forming expressions [Bach 1997; Fara 2003: 159; Chalmers manuscript a].[13]

In the previous section we were assuming a non-relativistic semantics without time parameters. Given a non-relativistic semantics without time parameters, 'So-and-so believes that *p*' is true in a context *c* iff for all worlds *w* compatible with the exact content of what so-and-so believes at the actual world @, *p* is true at *w*. If we include a time parameter, 'So-and-so believes that *p*' is true in *c* iff for all worlds *w* compatible with the exact content of what so-and-so believes at $<@, t^*>$, *p* is true at $<w, t^*>$, where t^* is the time of speech. Given relativism, a proposition can be true or false only relative to a judge. So 'so-and-so believes that *p*' is true in *c* iff for all worlds *w* compatible with the exact content of what so-and-so believes at $<@, t^*>$, *p* is true at $<w, t^*$, so-and-so$>$. In other words, 'So-and-so believes *p*' is true iff *p* is true relative to so-and-so's standards in all worlds compatible with what so-and-so believes here and now.

Let us consider an example. Suppose *s* makes the following assertion (*s* is in a 'high-standards context' but was in a 'low standards' context, and John is in a 'low-standards' context):

(3) John believes I knew that my car was in the driveway back then.

Given a relativistic semantics, (3) is true at *s*'s context iff for all worlds *w* compatible with the exact content of what John believes at $<@, t^*>$, *s knew that her car was in the driveway back then* is true at $<w, t^*$, John$>$. In other words, given relativism, *s knew that s's car was in the driveway back then* can be true or false only relative to the judge, and the judge must be someone with the same standards as John. For simplicity we will say that the judge *is* John. Since (3) as uttered by *s* is true only if *s knew that her car was in the driveway back then* is true relative to John's epistemic standards, 'John believes that' operates on the epistemic standards or judge parameter (in addition to the world parameter). So, Stanley is wrong to suppose that there are no operators on the judge parameter.[14]

There is, however, a more serious problem in the vicinity. It is convenient to have circumstance-shifters in our language, because it allows us to talk about what is the case in non-actual circumstances of evaluation, for example, counterfactual circumstances. Without circumstance-shifters we would be forced to talk about what is the case in the actual speech situation. The reason for this is that the actual speech situation has a privileged semantic status: it is the default circumstance of evaluation. More carefully: the parameters of the default circumstance are all parameters of the actual

[13]Other considerations in favour of this account of belief reports include traditional Frege/Kripke puzzles.
[14]Consider the following argument: John believes I knew my car was in the driveway back then. I didn't know my car was in the driveway back then. Therefore, John has a false belief. The argument is clearly sound in a high-standards context. But it might be objected that if I am right, then the argument should be unsound. After all, I will, even in my high standards context, count (3) as true provided John believes, by his low standards, I knew about the location of my car. But the second premise is true if I did not know the same thing *by my standards*. Thanks to an anonymous referee here. By way of reply, the argument does actually come out as sound on my view. Granted, I will, even in my high-standards context, count (3) as true but I will not count the embedded sentence as true. That is, I will grant that John believes whatever he does but not that his belief is true.

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speech situation. If the parameters of our actual speech situation did not have a privileged semantic status, there would be nothing for circumstance-shifters to shift.

But relativism has given up on the idea that all the parameters of the actual speech situation have a privileged semantic status. While the world and time parameters of the actual speech situation have a privileged semantic status, the epistemic standard parameter does not. To decide whether my assertion of '*s* knows *p*' is true, it is not sufficient to look at the parameters of my actual speech situation. The circumstance of evaluation determined by the actual speech situation is only one of many possible circumstances of evaluation. If, however, there is no semantically privileged epistemic standard to operate on, the relativist, it would seem, cannot treat 'John believes that' as a circumstance-shifter that operates on epistemic standards. The problem for the relativist, then, is not that there are no good candidates to be operators that operate on epistemic standards, but rather that we shouldn't expect there to be such operators if relativism were right.

I offer the following reply on behalf of the relativist. Even though there is no semantically privileged epistemic standard parameter relative to the context of use, there is indeed a semantically privileged epistemic standard parameter relative to a context of use *and* a context of assessment. Hence, there is an epistemic standard parameter for circumstance-shifters to operate on.

Suppose you consider my utterance of (3). I am then the asserter, and you are the evaluator. So, it is the time and world of my assertion but the standards in play in your context that go into the circumstance of evaluation. 'John believes that' operates on the world and judge parameters of the circumstance. So (3) is true only if the embedded sentence is true by John's standards, which is as it should be.

Another problem Stanley raises for relativism turns on the factivity of 'know' [Stanley manuscript: 6].[15] Relativism apparently cannot account for the factivity of 'know'. Stanley considers and rejects three possible ways of accounting for factivity (y is the evaluator):

(a) 'x knows at t that p' is true at $<w, t, y>$ only if p is true at $<w, t, z>$ for all possible evaluators z.

(b) 'x knows at t that p' is true at $<w, t, y>$ only if p is true at $<w, t, y>$

(c) 'x knows at t that p' is true at $<w, t, y>$ only if p is true at $<w, t, x>$

(a) counterintuitively falsifies nearly all second-order knowledge claims. For some evaluators are in very demanding contexts, and so, mundane second-order knowledge claims like 'x knows at t that x knows she has hands' will be false regardless of who assesses it for truth. (b) counter-intuitively permits

[15]Stanley's three cases have the knowledge claim being evaluated at $<w, t^*, e>$ triples, where t^* is the time of evaluation. But this must be a typo; for relativists take circumstances to be determined by both the context of use and the context of assessment. The time and world parameters are determined by the context of use, and the epistemic standard parameter is determined by the context of assessment [MacFarlane 2005a]. As we will see, the interesting cases are those where 'p' contains a relative term. Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

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an evaluator to truly say '*x* knows *p*', even though *p* is false at the circumstance of evaluation determined by *x*'s standards. (c) counter-intuitively permits an evaluator *y* to truly say '*x* knows *p*', even though *p* is false at the circumstance of evaluation determined by *y*'s standards. Relativists, it seems, must reject the truism that 'know' is factive. Or so the argument goes.

To get a better sense of what is wrong with option (b), consider the following example. Assume, for argument's sake, that 'huge' and 'know' are both relative expressions [Richard 2004; Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson 2004]. BIG, who is 7′7″, believes on the basis of reliable testimony that MEAN, who is 5′5″, is huge. TINY is 2′10″, and the epistemic standards in play in his context are reasonably low. MEAN is huge compared to TINY. So, by (b), if TINY asserts 'BIG knows that MEAN is huge', what he says is true in his context, even though MEAN is not huge compared to BIG.

To get a better sense of what is wrong with (c), suppose, instead, that BIG justifiably believes that MEAN is small. MEAN is small compared to BIG. So, by (c), if TINY asserts 'BIG knows MEAN is small', what he says is true in his context, even though MEAN is not small compared to TINY.

It might be countered that Stanley has not ruled out the possibility that TINY's assertions are merely pragmatically unacceptable. However, it is not a live option for the relativist to accommodate our intuitions on pragmatic grounds. The correct norm of assertion, say the relativists, is not that one should assert *p* only if *p* is true in any context, but rather that one should assert *p* only if *p* is true in one's own context [Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson 2004; Lasersohn 2005; Lasersohn (forthcoming)]:

Norm of Assertion
You should only say something that's true when evaluated in the context you are in.

If the relativist opts for (b), then 'BIG knows MEAN is huge' may be true when evaluated in the context TINY is in. If it is, then by the Norm of Assertion, it ought to be assertible. If the relativist opts for (c), then 'BIG knows MEAN is small' may be true when evaluated in the context TINY is in. If it is, then by the Norm of Assertion, it ought to be assertable. So, it seems that the relativist cannot accommodate our intuitions.

Stanley's second objection is forceful. But I think the problem is not a consequence of 'know' being relative, but a consequence of there being relative expressions in the language [Brogaard forthcoming c]. Suppose that you are an *invariantist* about 'know', and suppose that I assert the following sentence at a time *t*:[16]

(4) Vinny the Vulture knows that rotting flesh is delicious.

Unless you think 'rotting flesh is delicious', as uttered by me here and now, has an absolute truth-value or no truth-value at all, it would seem that you

[16]The name 'Vinny the Vulture' is borrowed from Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson [2004].

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are forced to give up the factivity of 'know'. For Stanley's option (b) would allow (4) to be true, even though Vinny is revolted by rotting flesh, and Stanley's option (c) would allow (4) to be true, even if you and I were revolted by rotting flesh. The factivity problem thus has nothing to do with the distinctive semantic properties of 'know' (as invariantism was assumed).

This point can be made more vivid by considering other cases of relative expressions in the scope of factive mental state operators, for instance, 'Vinny the Vulture realizes that rotting flesh is delicious' or 'Peter the Penguin appreciates that this room is hot'. These sentences are true only if they are true in both the circumstance of evaluation determined by the speaker's context and a shifted circumstance of evaluation. Stanley's worries may thus be formulated more generally as follows: if there is any relative expression in the language, then we are required to give up the factivity of most factive mental state operators.

However, I think there is an option available to the relativist which Stanley has not considered. A relativist about 'know' could appeal to double-indexing in the following way:[17]

> 'x knows at t that p' is true at $<w, t, y>$ only if p is true at $<w, t, y>$ and at $<w, t, x>$.

An assertion of 'x knows p' is true at a circumstance of evaluation determined by a context of use and a context of assessment only if p is true at that circumstance and at the $<w, t, x>$ circumstance.

The double-indexing strategy can be extrapolated to account for other relative expressions within the scope of a factive mental state operator. For instance, the content of my assertion at t of:

(5) Vinny the Vulture realizes that rotting flesh is delicious.

is true at a circumstance $<w, t, \text{me}>$ determined by my context only if the content of 'rotting flesh is delicious' is true in $<w, t, \text{me}>$ *and* in $<w, t, \text{Vinny}>$. Likewise, the content of my assertion at t of

(6) Peter the Penguin appreciates the fact that this room is hot.

is true at a circumstance $<w, t, \text{me}>$ determined by my context only if the content of 'This room is hot' is true in $<w, t, \text{me}>$ *and* in $<w, t, \text{Peter}>$.

I believe something along these lines is correct. But the double-indexing strategy needs to be motivated. That can be done in the following way. As we have seen, it is quite plausible to think that mental state operators shift the epistemic standard parameter of the circumstance of evaluation determined by the context of use and the context of assessment. As (4) contains a propositional attitude verb (namely, 'know'), the epistemic

[17]This sort of double-indexing is different from, but not unlike, the sort of double-indexing which Hans Kamp thought was required to account for sentences like, 'A child was born who will be king' [Kamp 1971: 231]. Double indexing is also required to account for so-called double access sentences, such as 'John said that Mary is pregnant' [Higginbotham 2002].

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standard parameter is presumably shifted from the evaluator to Vinny the Vulture. So, if my assertion of (4) is true, then Vinny finds rotting flesh delicious. Furthermore, if an operator O is factive, then O*p* materially implies *p* in the circumstance of evaluation determined by the context of use. So, if O*p* is true at circumstance *c*, then *p* is true at *c*. So, if the content of my assertion of (4) is true at $<w, t, \text{you}>$, then the content of 'Rotting flesh is delicious' is true at $<w, t, \text{you}>$. Consequently, if the content of my assertion of (4) is true at $<w, t, \text{you}>$, then the content of 'Rotting flesh is delicious' is true at $<w, t, \text{Vinny}>$ and $<w, t, \text{you}>$.

IV. A Perspectival Semantics for 'Know'

I do not think there are any substantial objections to relativism. It is not technically implausible, and empirically it explains the linguistic data quite well. But I do have a methodological concern: it is not required to explain the linguistic data. Truth-contextualism, I will argue, does an equally good job explaining the problematic data.[18] Here is my working hypothesis: 'know' has the same semantic value in any context of use. The content of 'know' is (or determines) a function from circumstances to extensions.[19] But the circumstances are non-standard: they contain a judge parameter in addition to the time and world parameters.[20] The default value of the judge parameter is the speaker. So, by default, the extension of 'know' will vary with the standards in play in the speaker's context. As the default value of the judge parameter is the speaker, there is no need to distinguish between *a context of use* and *a context of assessment*.

The assumption that the content of 'know' is context-invariant is fairly uncontroversial. Invariantists agree with this assumption. Nor is it controversial to assume that the content of 'know' is, or determines, a function from circumstances of evaluation to extensions. Invariantists are required to make the same assumption. Otherwise, they would be unable to account for the variation in truth-value across different circumstances of evaluation (e.g., across worlds).

The controversial part is that the circumstance of evaluation contains a judge parameter in addition to a time and a world parameter. Stanley's first objection to relativism turned on exactly this sort of assumption. The assumption that circumstances of evaluation contain a judge parameter is believable only if the value of the parameter can be shifted. However, as mentioned above, I think that there *are* circumstance-shifters that operate on the judge parameter. Mental state operators, such as 'so-and-so believes that', may in fact be circumstance-shifters that operate on the world and the

[18]MacFarlane [2007; forthcoming] calls this brand of contextualism 'nonindexical contextualism'. As we will see, my account differs from MacFarlane's nonindexical contextualism with respect to how it deals with reported sentences.

[19]The extension of a sentence is its truth-value. The extension of a verb like 'know' is a set of ordered pairs of a subject and a proposition.

[20]I shall assume that a circumstance of evaluation contains a judge parameter rather than an epistemic standards parameter. This assumption makes it easier to extrapolate the semantics to account for expressions other than 'know'.

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judge parameters. 'So-and-so believes that *p*' is true iff for all worlds *w* compatible with what so-and-so believes at the world of utterance @ and time of utterance *t**, *p* is true at $<w, t^*$, so-and-so$>$. Suppose I make the following assertion in my current 'high-standards' context:

(3) John believes I knew that my car was in the driveway back then.

(3) is true at my context of use only if the content of the embedded sentence is true at circumstances compatible with what John actually believes. The value of the judge parameter in such circumstances must thus be John not me. So, 'John believes that' shifts the default value of the judge parameter from me to John. It is true, as DeRose points out, that *assertions* of sentences like (3) may require a follow-up, for instance 'But John is wrong' [DeRose 2006]. But (3) is true only if 'I knew that my car was in the driveway back then' is true relative to John's standards not the speaker's. So, 'John believes that' functions as a circumstance-shifter that operates on the judge and world parameters.

To account for circumstance shifts within the scope of factive mental state operators we need to introduce double-indexing. Consider, for instance, my assertion of:

(7) John is glad that he knows Sarah still loves him.

Because 'John is glad that' is factive, the content of 'John is glad that *p*' is true at a default circumstance of evaluation determined by the context of use only if *p* is true at that circumstance. So, the content of 'He knows Sarah still loves him' must be true relative to a default circumstance of evaluation that contains me as the judge. But because 'John is glad that' is a mental state operator that expresses a propositional attitude, it also functions as a circumstance-shifter that shifts the judge and world parameters. So, the embedded sentence 'He knows Sarah still loves him' is true only if the content it expresses is true relative to a circumstance of evaluation that has John as the judge. As 'John is glad that' is factive, (7) is true only if the content of the operand sentence is true relative to an actual circumstance of evaluation that has me as the judge. As a result, (7) is true only if the content of 'John knows Sarah still loves him' is true relative to an actual circumstance of evaluation that has me as the judge *and* a shifted circumstance of evaluation that has John as the judge.

We get the same result with other factive mental state operators, for instance, 'John realizes that', 'John is unhappy that', 'John knows that', 'John is displeased that', and so on. This is so because for any factive mental state operator '*s* ϕs that', '*s* ϕs that *p*' entails '*s* knows that *p*' [Williamson 2000: chap. 1].[21] So, in each of the following cases, the embedded sentence is evaluated with respect to a circumstance of evaluation that has the utterer as the judge and a circumstance of evaluation that has John as the judge:

[21]Note that on Williamson's account, 'negative operators' such as '*s* is unhappy that' and '*s* is displeased that' need not be analysable. Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

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(8) John is glad that he knows that Mary still loves him.

(9) John is unhappy that he knows that Mary has been cheating on him.

(10) John is displeased that he knows that Peter is Mary's new lover.

These sentences are normally assertible only if the embedded sentence is true by the utterer's *and* John's epistemic standards. This explains why it would make little sense to follow up with 'But he is wrong' (witness the infelicity of 'John is unhappy that he knows that Mary has been cheating on him, but John doesn't know that Mary has been cheating on him').

In the above cases the circumstance shifts are operator controlled. But there are also free shifts, as in:[22]

(11) John has gone insane. No one knows anything, not even that they have hands.

The acceptability of (11) can be explained on the assumption that there is an implicit circumstance-shifter, such as 'according to John' or 'John thinks that', in the sentence structure. (11), upon analysis, cashes out to:

(11a) John has gone insane. According to John, no one knows anything, not even that they have hands.

(11) thus provides further evidence for our hypothesis that the value of the judge parameter is subject to circumstance shifts.

It may be objected that cases like (11) seem best treated as indirect discourse reports rather than as a judge-shifted attribution. For in similar contexts the sentence following 'John has gone insane' could well be one that was false even when the judge parameter is shifted to John, such as 'His head is earthenware'.[23]

By way of reply, 'John's head is earthenware' is indeed false at the actual world even if John is the judge. But I am not suggesting that 'according to John' shifts only the judge parameter. I am suggesting that it shifts the judge parameter and the world parameter of the circumstance. In other words, I am suggesting that indirect discourse operators, such as 'according to John', should be treated as operator forming expressions. I already offered an argument for the thesis that attitude verbs are best treated as operator forming expressions. The very same argument can be used to show that indirect discourse operators must be treated as intensional operators.

'According to so-and-so, *p*' is true iff for all worlds *w* compatible with the exact content of what so-and-so would assent to at the world of speech @ and the time of speech t^*, *p* is true at $<w, t^*, \text{so-and-so}>$. So, 'According to John, his head is earthenware' is true iff for all worlds *w* compatible with the exact content of what John would assent to at $<@, t^*>$, the proposition *John's head is earthenware* is true at $<w, t, \text{John}>$.

[22]This example is based on Recanati's [1987] example: 'John is totally paranoid. Everyone wants to kill him, including his own mother'.
[23]Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

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It is also possible to dispense with the requirement that the content of a sentence containing 'know' be evaluated at a circumstance of evaluation that has the speaker as the default judge in free indirect speech, which is often used in fictional narratives:

(12) John wondered whether he knew that his car was still in the driveway. He parked it there earlier. But the neighbour's car had recently been stolen. Perhaps the car thief had been in the neighbourhood again, while he had been away. The more he thought about it, the more certain he became: he didn't know that the car was still in the driveway.

'He didn't know that the car was still in the driveway' is true only if John didn't know that the car was still in the driveway by his standards, not the narrator's.

Call an expression whose intension is constant but whose extension is contextually variable in my sense a 'perspectival'.[24] Our working hypothesis then is that assertions containing perspectivals are true relative to circumstances of evaluation that contain not only a world and a time parameter but also a judge parameter. The default value of the judge parameter is the speaker, but circumstance-shifters that operate on the value of the judge parameter (e.g., 'according to John') can shift the value.

Since the default value of the judge parameter is determined by the speaker parameter of the context of *use*, perspectivals are context-sensitive. But they are not context-sensitive in the same way as indexicals. Where indexicals have variable semantic values, perspectivals have variable extensions.

V. Solving the Problems

Perspectivalism sidesteps the issues outlined above for content-contextualism and truth-relativism.

First, it solves the retraction problem without appealing to semantic blindness or contexts of assessment. Recall that a relativistic semantics for 'know' is motivated first and foremost by meta-linguistic data. When the standards have gone up, I am inclined to retract earlier knowledge-ascriptions made under different standards. I might assert:[25]

(13) The sentence 'I know my car is in the driveway', as uttered by me earlier today, was false.

Taken at face value, the felicity of this sentence should be puzzling from any standard contextualist point of view. For the sentence that is evaluated occurs in a direct speech report. And, as François Recanati has argued [Recanati 2004: § 3.2], there is good reason to think that a quoted sentence

[24]I am here using the word 'perspectival' differently from Recanati [1994] and Anne Bezuidenhout [2003; 2005], who use it to mean 'an expression whose *semantic value* can be freely shifted'.

[25]This kind of talk is not very natural. It would be more natural to say 'What I said earlier was false'. But in the latter case falsehood is ascribed to a proposition. As MacFarlane [manuscript] points out, this case is easy for non-relativistic semantics to account for.

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in a direct report is used, not simply mentioned. One reason is that the quoted material in a direct speech report may be available for copying, as in:[26]

(14) 'I'm going to see the dean', she said; and she did.

'And she did' is elliptical for 'and she did see the dean'. So, the elided material 'see the dean' is available for copying. But this suggests that the quoted material is used. For if the sentence were merely mentioned, the quoted material would not be available for copying, witness "'I'm going to see the dean'' is a sentence; and she did'.

Another reason to think a quoted sentence in a direct report is used, not simply mentioned, is that expressions in the matrix clause can depend anaphorically on expressions in the quoted sentence. Consider, for instance:

(15) 'Give me your money$_i$, or I'll shoot', he said, but I didn't give it$_i$ to him.

The pronoun 'it' in the matrix clause is anaphoric on 'your money'. But this requires that 'your money' picks out an individual for 'it' to refer to.

Recanati suggests that contextual clues associated with direct speech reports (e.g. quotation marks, lead-up, etc.) create a shifted context that determines the semantic values of the indexicals in the report. So, in the case of my assertion of 'And then John said, "I am leaving now"' the semantic value of 'I' is John, not me, and the semantic value of 'now' is a time in the past, not the current time. Direct speech reports can thus be seen to function as context-shifters, or monsters, as Kaplan called them [Kaplan 1989: 510].[27] Kaplan thought there weren't any context-shifting *operators* in English, but didn't rule out direct speech report shifts.[28]

Given Recanati's account of direct speech reports, the retraction problem may be formulated as follows: 'know' does not seem to change its semantic value when it occurs in a direct speech report. Pure indexicals like 'I' and 'now' and impure indexicals with hidden variables, like 'enemy' and 'local', do seem to change their semantic value in direct speech reports.[29]

However, this difference between indexicals, like 'I' and 'now', and 'know' is easily explained on the assumption that 'know' is a perspectival. Following Kaplan, the context of use plays two distinct roles: it fixes the value of indexicals, and it determines a default circumstance of evaluation. Context-shifters shift the semantic value of indexicals (they operate on character). So, if the semantic value of 'know' is constant across context, it is not surprising that it is insensitive to the operations of context-shifters.

[26]The first argument is Recanati's [§ 3.2, example 4]; the second is my own [Brogaard forthcoming a].

[27]Kaplan: 'No operator can control the character of the indexical within its scope, because they will simply leap out of its scope to the front of the operator. I am not saying we could not construct a language with such operators, just that English is not one. And such operators could not be added to it'.

[28]As he puts it, 'There is a way to control an indexical, to keep it from taking primary scope, and even to refer it to another context. Use quotation marks. If we mention the indexical rather than use it, we can, of course, operate directly on it'.

[29]'Enemy' and 'local' seem to be associated with hidden variables that are contextually completed, or bound by higher operators. 'Every student went to a local bar', for example, has a reading where the higher operator 'every student' binds the variable associated with 'local'. See, however, Cappelen and Lepore [2002] for problems with this kind of argument.

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It might, of course, be thought that context-shifters shift not only the parameters of the context, but also the circumstance with respect to which a proposition is evaluated. There would indeed be nothing incoherent about an operator that operated on both context and circumstance. But direct speech report markers do not function in this way. To shift the parameters of the circumstance of evaluation we need a circumstance-shifter. For example, the proposition expressed by 'I am hungry' is evaluated with respect to the circumstance of evaluation determined by the context of use in an assertion of 'John says, "I am hungry"', but with respect to a shifted circumstance in an assertion of 'John *said*, "I am hungry"'. Our problematic sentence, viz. 'The sentence "I know that my car is in the driveway", as uttered by me earlier, was false' contains a circumstance-shifter, namely the past-tense operator. But the past-tense operator is selective. It operates on the time parameter, not the judge parameter. So, the circumstance of evaluation with respect to which the quoted sentence is interpreted is a triple of this world, a past time, and me, as I am currently constituted. In short: direct speech reports do not shift the judge parameter of the circumstance of evaluation because they do not operate on circumstances.

In the above cases we focused on direct speech reports. But evaluators may not actually utter the reported sentences; they may just quietly assess them for truth. For example, I might quietly think to myself: 'Earlier I said "I know my car is in the driveway" but I was wrong'. However, such cases can be treated in the same way as direct speech report cases; for, on Kaplan's theory, any sequence of parameters that includes a speaker, an addressee, a world, a time, and a location counts as a context. The speaker need not be speaking, and the addressee need not be listening. So, a context in which someone quietly assesses a sentence for truth is a context. A sentence assessed in such a context can be treated as reported, and so this variety of assessment can be treated in the same way as cases of direct speech report.[30]

Second, the extension of unembedded occurrences of 'know' seems to depend on the epistemic standards in play in the context of use, whereas the extension of occurrences of 'know' in the scope of operators like 'so-and-so believes that' depends on the standards in play in so-and-so's context. If 'know' is a perspectival, this sort of variability is exactly as it should be. For the speaker parameter of the context of use then determines a default circumstance of evaluation that has the speaker as the value of the judge parameter. The value can then be shifted by circumstance-shifters. This addresses Stanley's worry about the inclusion of a judge parameter in the circumstance of evaluation.

Third, on the assumption that there are perspectivals in English, Stanley's factivity worry also fades away. My assertion of 'Vinny the Vulture knows that rotting flesh is delicious' seems true only if it is true in Vinny's context *and* true in mine. Perspectivalism explains these data. Mental state and indirect discourse operators create a shifted circumstance of evaluation in which the judge is someone other than the speaker. But if an operator O is factive, then Op materially implies p at the circumstance of evaluation determined by the context of use. So, if Op is true at circumstance c, then p is

[30]Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

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true at *c*. So, 'Vinny knows that rotting flesh is delicious' is true only if rotting flesh is delicious at the circumstance of evaluation determined by my context.

VI. Why Perspectivalism Is Preferable to Relativism

Perspectivalism explains the same data as relativism but without relativizing sentence truth to a context of assessment. It is superior to relativism, however, because it does not require as radical a departure from orthodox semantics as relativism. But an objection here arises. Some relativist positions are quite simple methodologically speaking. For instance, Andy Egan holds a relativist position on which propositions are functions from centred worlds to truth-values rather than from worlds to truth-values [Egan 2007]. The centred worlds view seems no more theoretically complex than perspectivalism.[31] In fact, as relativism and perspectivalism both allow for (or require) judges in the circumstances of evaluation, it may appear that there is no difference between them.

However, this is not right. Both relativism and perspectivalism will treat semantic content as functions from centred worlds to truth-values, or alternatively, from <world, (time), judge> triples to truth-values. So, if we focus on semantic content, then there will be no difference—notional differences aside—between relativism and perspectivalism. But to say that relativism and perspectivalism both treat semantic content as relative is not to say that there is no difference between them. The main difference concerns utterances (i.e., sentences-in-contexts) and assertoric content (i.e., the content asserted). Perspectivalism, like other non-relativistic theories, treats utterances as true or false simpliciter. Relativism, on the other hand, treats utterances as true or false only relative to a judge.

However, it may appear that there is no difference between perspectivalism and relativism, even if we focus on utterance truth. After all, given our account of direct speech reports, it seems as though anyone who evaluates an utterance of '*s* knows that *p*' will create a context in which they are to be seen as the speaker of a knowledge attribution. If *x* evaluates an earlier utterance of '*s* knows that *p*', she must ask herself, 'Did *s* know that *p*?', and in asking herself this she creates a new context of use. But then it seems as though the default judge will in practice always be the evaluator of the proposition.

By way of reply, we already know that 'is true' means different things in the object language and in the meta-language. In the object language we can infer 'John is at Syracuse' from '"John is at Syracuse" is true' [Schiffer 1987; Hofweber 2005].[32] But we cannot do that in the meta-language. In the meta-language, the utterance 'John is at Syracuse' may be true if John was at Syracuse from 1990 to 2000. So, in the meta-language 'The utterance "John

[31]Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

[32]Another possibility is to say that we cannot infer that John is in Syracuse from '"John is in Syracuse" is true' because 'John is in Syracuse' is indexical. Thanks to an anonymous referee here. I draw a distinction between object-language and meta-language uses of 'true', in part because I do not think that 'John is in Syracuse' is indexical. That is, I do not think the sentence expresses different propositions relative to different contexts of use. For related discussion see MacFarlane [forthcoming].

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is at Syracuse'' is true' does not entail that John is at Syracuse. In other words, some difference must exist between object-language occurrences and meta-language occurrences of 'is true'.

Moreover, given Recanati's account of direct speech reports, object-language occurrences of both S and 'S is true' are true iff S expresses a proposition that is true at the circumstance of evaluation determined by the context of the speaker who uttered S or 'S is true' [Brogaard forthcoming c]. But surely Recanati's account of direct speech reports does not entail relativism or undermine the possibility of standard semantics altogether. So the occurrence of 'true' in the meta-language is the usual one (given Kaplan-style semantics). In the meta-language, S as uttered in *c* is true simpliciter iff the proposition expressed by S in *c* is true at the circumstance of evaluation determined by the context of the speaker who uttered S (and not the context of the semanticist). In other words, the main difference between relativism and perspectivalism concerns the truth predicate for utterances (or sentences-in-contexts) in the meta-language.[33] So the difference between relativism and perspectivalism is not purely notional.

But does this difference make a real difference? It does indeed. Focusing on semantic content in a narrow sense will *not* help us explain the difference between non-relativism and relativism. For content truth is already relativistic in non-relativistic semantics that recognizes tense operators and/or modal operators: content truth is relative to possible worlds and perhaps times. However, non-relativistic semantics usually recognizes a special kind of content that is not relative to possible worlds or times, namely assertoric content [Stanley 1997a; 1997b]. Assertoric content is content that is asserted by an assertive utterance. It has special status because it is the content believed and asserted by the speaker of the utterance if the speaker is sincere.

Relativists like Egan are not opposed to these kinds of considerations. On Egan's account, propositions are functions from <world, (time), judge> pairs to truth-values. Or in a different terminology: propositions are sets of centred worlds. But Egan argues that speakers should only assert the proposition that corresponds to the set of centred worlds that includes the centred world that contains the speaker. In other words, speakers should only assert propositions that are true relative to their own standards.[34]

But since relativists insist that utterances are true or false only relative to a judge, they cannot easily explain what is so special about the content that is true relative to the speaker's location.[35] For instance, they cannot easily explain why we should *only* believe content that is true relative to the speaker's location/standards. The perspectivalist can say that we should only believe content that is true relative to our own location/standards because only this sort of content is such that if we were to express it, our utterance would be true simpliciter. But the relativist cannot say that.

[33]Or if you dislike the object language/meta-language distinction, we can say that there are two different kinds of truth predicates: absolute truth and relative truth. The absolute truth predicate is the one the semanticist uses when formulating truth-conditions for utterances.
[34]Moreover, the audience has to be within a certain epistemic reach.
[35]MacFarlane [2005b: 331] raises a related objection to a related formulation of the norm of assertion.

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Given relativism, utterances will not be true or false simpliciter; they will be true or false only relative to judges (or contexts of assessments). So the relativist's explanation of why speakers should refrain from believing things that are true only relative to other judges will be a lot more complicated. Most likely it is going to appeal to practical considerations, for instance, the consideration that beliefs are the sorts of things speakers act on. But it is very hard to give an account of the inherent value of true belief along those lines. Few of our beliefs are beliefs we would normally act on. For instance, I believe that elephants are larger than mice, but I have never acted on this belief. Yet unlike *mice are larger than elephants*, *elephants are larger than mice* is worthy of belief. The perspectivalist has a simple explanation of why only the latter is worthy of belief; it is worthy of belief because it alone is such that if I were to express it, my utterance would be true simpliciter.

Let us even grant, at least for the sake of argument, that relativism can offer an equally plausible explanation of why only content that is true relative to the speaker's standards is worthy of belief. There is still good reason to prefer perspectivalism to relativism. Perspectivalism preserves the meta-linguistic notion of truth simpliciter. Relativism replaces truth simpliciter with relative truth. But without good reason to prefer the less conservative theory, the more conservative theory wins.[36]

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