

DISJUNCTIVISM

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INTRODUCTION

Disjunctivism with respect to a kind of bodily or mental state or reason S is the view that S-states or reasons can be divided into more fundamental kinds of entities which have different kinds of entities as their essential constituents or which differ in what kind of information, evidence or motivation they provide. The most well-known version of disjunctivism was an offspring of one of the oldest theories of perception, viz. naïve realism. To a first approximation, naïve realism is the view that perceptions have mind-independent objects among their constituents. Many historical philosophers (from Locke to Russell) argued that naïve realism must be rejected on the grounds that hallucinations are perceptual experiences which do not have mind-independent objects among their constituents. Their reasoning, roughly, went as follows. Perceptions and hallucinations are constitutively on a par. Hence, either both perceptions and hallucinations have mind-independent objects among their constituents or neither does. As hallucinations do not have mind-independent objects among their constituents, neither do perceptions. Contemporary philosophers have resurrected the theory by treating perception and hallucination as having different kinds of entities among their constituents. This version of naïve realism has come to be known as ‘the disjunctive conception of experience’. Epistemological disjunctivism and disjunctivism about phenomenal belief, or what I shall call ‘introspective disjunctivism’, have also gained popularity in recent years. Epistemological disjunctivism is the view that only genuine cases of perception provide (good) perceptual evidence. Introspective disjunctivism is the view that genuine phenomenal beliefs have phenomenal properties among their constituents. More recently disjunctivist accounts of bodily movements, abilities and reasons for action have entered the philosophical scene. These accounts treat the relevant bodily or mental entities as divisible into different kinds which have different kinds of entities among their constituents or which satisfy different epistemic or practical constraints. This entry focuses on the contemporary debate about the different varieties of disjunctivism just outlined: their characterization, their motivation and their potential shortcomings.

GENERAL OVERVIEWS

There are several good introductory overviews of the debate about disjunctivism. One is Crane's Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry entitled "The Problem of Perception". It offers a good overview of the arguments from illusion and hallucination. Traditionally these arguments were taken to motivate sense-data theory. Disjunctivism is now one of the more common ways of responding to the arguments. Haddock and Macpherson's "Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism" provides an overview of the distinct forms of disjunctivism traditionally defended in the literature. They classify Snowdon as an experiential disjunctivist, McDowell as an epistemic disjunctivist and Martin as a phenomenal disjunctivist. Another excellent overview article is Byrne and Logue's "Either/Or", which also provides an overview of the distinct kinds of disjunctivism. They distinguish among: Hintoneque disjunctivism, which denies that there is a common structural element in good and bad cases of perception, Austinian disjunctivism, which holds that there is a fundamental difference between the object one is aware of in good and bad cases of perception, and epistemological disjunctivism, which holds that there is a difference in epistemic status of the perceptual evidence provided in good and bad cases of perception. Byrne and Logue also discuss how different authors classify illusions. Finally, they offer an argument against disjunctivism that turns on the disjunctivist dictum that there is no specific mental state or event common to the good and the bad case. Byrne and Logue also have a good introductory overview printed in their collection *Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings*. Here they distinguish the different kinds of disjunctivism and give a concise overview of the arguments for and against. Fish has good Internet Encyclopedia entry on disjunctivism at <http://www.iep.utm.edu/disjunct/>. Soteriou has a good entry on disjunctivism forthcoming in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Campbell (2002) defends naïve realism for the good case. Finally it should be mentioned that Chalmers and Bourget have a PhilPapers entry on disjunctivism, which is updated regularly.

Byrne, A. and Logue, H. 2008. "Either/Or". In A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, eds., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford University Press.
[Accessible overview of different kinds of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Also contains a useful classification of metaphysical disjunctivism in terms of how illusions are treated and two arguments against metaphysical disjunctivism.]

Byrne, A. and Logue, H. 2009. "Introduction", in A. Byrne and H. Logue, ed. *Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings*. Mit Press.
[Accessible overview of the different kinds of disjunctivism and the main reasons for and against.]

Campbell, J. 2002. *Reference and Consciousness*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[Defends a relational (naive realist) view of veridical perception. Campbell motivates the view by arguing that it is required to make sense of our knowledge of demonstrative reference. He also attempts to reconcile the view with the findings of empirical science.]

Chalmers, D. and Bourget, D. 2009. "PhilPapers: Disjunctivism", edited by Heather Logue. <http://philpapers.org/browse/disjunctivism/>.
[Bibliography updated regularly. Logue is the current editor.]

Crane, T., 2008. "The Problem of Perception", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/perception-problem/>.
[Critical discussion of the arguments from hallucination and illusion.]

Fish, W. 2009. "Disjunctivism", *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/disjunct/>.
[Good accessible entry on disjunctivism which presents the classic arguments for and against and shows how disjunctivists treat hallucination and illusion.]

Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. 2008. "Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism", in A. Haddock and F. Macpherson, ed., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[Offers an account of the distinct kinds of metaphysical disjunctivism. Also offers an overview of epistemological disjunctivism and disjunctivism in the philosophy of action.]

Soteriou, M. Forthcoming. "The Disjunctive Theory of Perception", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
[Accessible overview of the main debates about the disjunctive conception of perceptual experience.]

TEXTBOOKS

There are several books on disjunctivism that would be suitable as textbooks. A good textbook for upper-level undergraduate and graduate seminars on perception and philosophy of mind is Haddock and Macpherson's reader *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. This collection contains seventeen new essays on various kinds of disjunctivism, including metaphysical disjunctivism, epistemological disjunctivism and disjunctivism in the philosophy of action. Contributors include: Bill Brewer, Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, William Fish, Adrian Haddock, Jennifer Hornsby, Heather Logue, E. J. Lowe, Fiona MacPherson, John McDowell, Alan Miller, Ram Neta, Duncan Pritchard, David-Hillel Ruben, Sonia Sedivy, Susanna Siegel, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon, Scott Sturgeon, and Crispin Wright. Another good textbook is Byrne and Logue's reader *Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings*, which contains many classic essays defending or responding to disjunctivism. Contributors include Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, and Paul Snowdon. (Fish 2009) is a book-length defense of disjunctivism, which also discusses some of the empirical evidence from brain science. This book is suitable as a resource for graduate-level seminars on perception and philosophy of mind. Fish (2010) is a good introduction to the philosophy of perception, which also includes a chapter on disjunctivism. Smith's *The Problem of Perception* is a book-length defense of a naïve realist position that allows for direct acquaintance with an object in veridical

perception cases as well as cases of hallucination. This book is suitable for upper-level undergraduate and graduate seminars on perception and philosophy of mind.

Byrne, A. and H. Logue, ed. (2009) *Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings*, Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press.

[Reader on disjunctivism containing many classic texts defining or responding to disjunctivism. Suitable as a textbook for use in graduate-level seminars on perception and philosophy of mind.]

Haddock, A. and F. Macpherson, eds., (2008). *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford University Press. [Seventeen essays characterizing the different kinds of disjunctivism and their interconnections. Suitable as a textbook for use in graduate-level seminars on perception and philosophy of mind.]

Fish, W. 2009. *Perception, Hallucination and Illusion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Defends a version of disjunctivism which takes veridical perception to involve a perceiver's being acquainted with a state of affairs. The experience's phenomenal character derives from the perceiver standing in this acquaintance relation. Hallucinations lack phenomenal character but are mistakenly supposed by the perceiver to have it. Suitable as a textbook for use in graduate-level seminars on perception and philosophy of mind.]

Fish, W. 2010. *Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction*, New York: Routledge.

[A general introduction the philosophy of perception aimed at higher-level undergraduates. Contains five chapters on theories of perception, including one on disjunctive theories, and three further chapters, including one on the relationship between philosophy of perception and empirical science.]

Smith, A. D. 2002. *The Problem of Perception*, Harvard University Press.

[Defends a naïve realist position that allows for direct acquaintance with an object in both good and bad cases of perception. In hallucinations the perceiver is directly acquainted with a non-existent object which supervenes on the experience's subjective properties. The position is disjunctivist because of differences in this kind of supervenience. Suitable for use in seminars on perception or philosophy of mind.]

METAPHYSICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Metaphysical disjunctivism is typically construed as the view that good and bad cases of perception have different kinds of entities among their essential constituents. On Hinton's way of defining disjunctivism, good and bad cases of perception have no common factor (J. M. Hinton 1967, 1973). This claim, that good and bad cases of perception have no common factor, should not be taken to mean that good and bad cases can always be distinguished subjectively. Rather it is probably best treated as a claim to the effect that good and bad cases are fundamentally

different kinds of mental states. For example, one could hold that in cases of veridical perception perception is a relation between a subject and a mind-independent object, whereas hallucinations are sensory experiences with representational content. Or one could hold that veridical perception cases are cases of direct acquaintance with a mind-independent object, whereas hallucination cases are belief-like states. Martin (2002: 404; 2004: 43, 54, 60) defines disjunctivism in terms of the notion of a fundamental kind. Veridical perception cases and hallucination cases are of different fundamental kinds. McDowell (1982), Snowdon (1980-1) and Martin (2006) hold that good and bad cases of experience are both cases in which it looks to one as if things are a certain way (or something cognate). Irrespective of the differences, perhaps fundamental, between good and bad cases of experience, they are the same in this respect. One might also include among the disjunctivist positions the view which Byrne and Logue (see *General Overviews) call ‘Austinian disjunctivism’. This is a kind of disjunctivism about the object of experience rather than about the structure of experience. It was allegedly not held by Austin himself, though inspired by what he says about the argument from illusion in *Sense and Sensibilia*. Byrne and Logue argue that one could convert a “merely” Austinian disjunctivism into the more radical Hintonesque disjunctivism rather easily, simply by adding the claim that one bears different *relations* to the different objects in good and bad cases (p. 64). Thau (2004) (see *Illusion) argues that disjunctivism about the object of experience is different from disjunctivism about experience. Byrne and Logue (see *General Overviews) discuss how metaphysical disjunctivists classify illusions differently. Some treat them as genuine relational perceptions; others treat them as flawed in much the same ways as hallucinations are. Discussion of the relation between metaphysical disjunctivism and the causal theory of perception can be found in Snowdon (1980-1) and Child (1992).

Child, W. 1992. “Vision and Experience: The Causal Theory and the Disjunctive Conception”, *Philosophical Quarterly* 42: 297-316. [Addresses Snowdon’s argument to the effect that disjunctivism makes trouble for the causal theory of vision. Argues that disjunctivism is compatible with the causal theory of vision and that a causal theory is required to adequately address two essential questions concerning experience, viz. the questions of why a given experience occurred, and how it can have the content that it does.]

Hinton, J. M. 1967. “Experiences”, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 17: 1-13. [Hinton’s first articulation of the disjunctive conception of experience.]

Hinton, J. M. 1973. *Experiences*, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Book-length defense of the ‘no common factor’ conception of visual experience.]

Martin, M. G. F. 2002. “The Transparency of Experience”, *Mind and Language*, 17: 376-425. [Argues that the standard problems for sense data theories, that of explaining the intuitions that experiences are about mind-independent entities, and that experience is transparent, are explanatory challenges. Then considers how intentional theories and

naïve realism might address these challenges. Finally argues that intentional theories face challenges that are much like the challenges for the sense-data theory with respect to sensory imagination.]

Martin, M. G. F. 2004. “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, *Philosophical Studies*, 120: 37–89. [States the prime motivation for endorsing disjunctivism and how to understand its various formulations. Then addresses the question of how disjunctivism is to handle cases of hallucinations which have the same proximate causes as the corresponding veridical perceptions.]

Martin, M. G. F. 2006. “On Being Alienated”, in T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne ed., *Perceptual Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [The paper is about the relationship between Martin’s naïve realism and issues concerning phenomenal consciousness. Discusses Cartesian skepticism in a brief final section.]

McDowell, J. 1982. “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 68: 455-79. [A discussion of Wittgenstein’s views on ‘criteria’ and the problem of other minds. Addresses the problem of how evidence constituted by behaviorial and bodily signals can ever be good enough for knowledge. McDowell thinks that one can indeed just perceive a person as, say, sad when the person is sad, because a fact is made manifest to one in these kinds of cases. Perceptual experience can be either a mere appearance or a case in which a fact is made manifest, which means that the case of illusions presents no threat to this position.]

Snowdon, P. 1980–1. “Perception, Vision, and Causation”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 81: 175–92. [Argues that because there is a disjunctive conception of experience, the argument for the causal theory of perception – understood as a theory about the concept of perception – is missing a premise, viz. one which shows that our concept of perception rules out the disjunctive conception.]

METAPHYSICAL DISJUNCTIVISM: CRITIQUE

Critiques of classical metaphysical disjunctivism can be found in e.g. Johnston (2004), Siegel (2004), Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006), Hellie (2006), and Byrne and Logue (2008) (see *General Overviews).

Hawthorne, J. and Kovakovich, K. 2006. “Disjunctivism”, *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 80: 145–183. [Criticizes disjunctivists’ use of discriminability facts as a basis for understanding perceptual experience and Martin’s master argument for disjunctivism.]

Hellie, B. 2006. “Beyond Phenomenal Naivete”, *Philosophers’ Imprint* 6: 1-24. [Argues against the phenomenological case for naïve realism.]

Johnston, M. 2004. "The Obscure Object of Hallucination", *Philosophical Studies* 120: 113–183. [Criticizes disjunctivist versions of naive realism and offers a non-disjunctive version that avoids the argument from hallucination.]

Siegel, S. 2004. "Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal", *Philosophical Studies* 120: 91–112. [Argues against Martin's assumption that phenomenality is closely linked to indiscriminability from veridical perception, an assumption, which plays a major role in Martin's argument for disjunctivism. Also discusses Martin's argument against the common-kind theory and the notion of looking the same.]

EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Epistemological disjunctivism is the view that there is a difference in epistemic status between the perceptual evidence available in good and bad cases of perception. When construed in this way, epistemological disjunctivism is a relatively uncontroversial position. When one hallucinates, there is no external object; hence, one cannot come to have knowledge of an external object. However, epistemic internalists might reject this position on the grounds that perceptual evidence is experientially acquired evidence which is internally accessible to the perceiver. McDowell (1982) (*Metaphysical Disjunctivism) first proposed epistemological disjunctivism as a way of avoiding skepticism about other minds. Byrne and Logue (2008) (see *General Overviews*) argue that McDowell's alleged *metaphysical* disjunctivist position is best understood as a version of epistemological disjunctivism. This claim is countered in Brogaard (2008). Haddock and Macpherson (2008) (see *General Overviews) argue that it is not clear that McDowell's version of disjunctivism needs to be a form of metaphysical disjunctivism in order to do the epistemological work which McDowell wants it to do; they do not deny that McDowell sometimes presents his version as a form of metaphysical disjunctivism. McDowell offers a clear re-statement of his position in his (2006). There have been a number of recent reactions to epistemological disjunctivism. I can only mention a few here. Comesana (2005) argues against McDowell on the grounds that McDowell holds that one can have a mere appearance or an appearance in which facts make themselves manifest to one, but that only the latter can justify belief and give rise to knowledge. If one draws a distinction between epistemic justification and warrant, then one can hold that mere appearances sometimes justify belief without thereby being committed to a skeptical outcome. Conee (2007) discusses one of the epistemic motivations for metaphysical disjunctivism, viz. the thought that by positing metaphysical differences between good and bad cases of perception we can avoid the threat of skepticism. Certain differences between good and bad cases of perception make no epistemic difference. For example, the modal status of the relation between the object of perception and the perceiver makes no epistemic difference. Whether or not hallucinations have content has no bearing on the strength of perceptual reasons. Any potential difference between good and bad cases which might make an epistemic difference can be accounted for on non-distinctive views of perception. Neta (2008) considers McDowell's argument to the effect that the only satisfactory explanation of why good cases of perception put us in a better epistemic position than bad cases is that a fact is made manifest to us in the good cases but not in the bad case. Though it may not be subjectively discernible whether or not a fact is made manifest, whether or not a fact is made manifest makes

a difference to the perceptual evidence available in the two kinds of cases. This sort of argument can be resisted by arguing that the only good explanation of the difference in epistemic status is one that appeals to facts made manifest. For example, it may be said that the best explanation of this fact is just that in cases of veridical perception but not hallucination, the belief acquired is reliably or safely formed. No difference in the nature of the perceptions themselves is required to explain this difference. Neta also considers objections to the effect that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable and hence provide the perceiver the same perceptual evidence. He responds that the disjunctivist doesn't need to posit that good and bad cases can be distinguished subjectively by the subject. All she needs to do is to show that the best explanation for why there is a difference in perceptual evidence is that a difference already resides in the structure of the perceptual experiences providing the evidence. Millar (2008) discusses the epistemic motivation for disjunctivism. Disjunctivism provides a way of making sense of the relational nature of the perception without necessarily being committed to the ultra-realism ala Meinong where one is related to an object that doesn't exist in hallucination cases. But it also allegedly provides a way of making sense of perceptual knowledge, which is thought to involve cognitive contact with objects. Perceptual knowledge is a kind of demonstrative thought about objects. Relationalists think that in order for one to have this sort of cognitive contact with objects, the grounding experience must itself be a relation to an object. If one can have the same experience even without an object present, then it would seem that experiences cannot play any significant role in grounding perceptual knowledge. Millar argues that the relationalist is right in thinking perceptual knowledge puts us in cognitive contact with objects but he doesn't think that experience itself needs to be genuinely relational for us to have perceptual knowledge. Cognitive contact consists in the exercise of our perceptual-recognitional abilities in response to perceptual experience, and this sort of contact does not require that experience be essentially relational. Pritchard (2008) argues that McDowell-style disjunctivism can be used to main a version of the Moorean response to the skeptic. The Moorean response to the skeptic is to say that we have perceptual evidence for ordinary claims such "I have a hand" and then via certain closure principles infer that we have evidence for more radical claims such as the claim that we are not disembodied brains in vats. Moore's position seems absurd if we take seriously the possibility that we might be in a radical skeptical scenario. If I am a disembodied brain in a vat, then how could the appearance of a hand provide evidence for the claim that I have hands? Pritchard argues that disjunctivism might come to our rescue here. We might say that in the good cases of perception, the appearance of a hand does indeed provide good evidence for the claim that I have a hand, even if the appearance of a hand does not provide good evidence for this claim in the bad case of perception. Gundersen (forthcoming) offers objections to disjunctivist ways of accommodating the intuition that knowledge is closed under the entailment relation.

Brogaard, B. 2008. "Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism", Ms. Completed at the Australian National University.

[Argues that McDowell's disjunctivism is metaphysical rather than epistemic. Then provides an alternative to the standard McDowell-style disjunctivism which denies that all and only veridical perceptions make facts manifest.]

Comesana, J. 2005. “Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71: 367-383. [Offers an epistemic argument against Hintonesque disjunctivism, the view that there is no highest common factor between the good and the bad cases of perception.]

Conee, E. 2007. “Disjunctivism and Anti-Skepticism”, *Philosophical Issues* 17: 16–36. [Discusses whether metaphysical disjunctivism can avoid the threat of skepticism. Argues that whether or not hallucinations have content has no bearing on the strength of perceptual reasons. Any potential difference between good and bad cases which might make an epistemic difference can be accounted for on non-distinctive views.]

Gundersen, L. B. Forthcoming. “Disjunctivism, Contextualism and the Sceptical Aporia”, *Synthese*. [Argues that epistemological disjunctivism and contextualism cannot solve certain problems for the principle that knowledge is closed under entailment.]

McDowell, J. 1982. “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 68: 455-79. [See description above.]

McDowell, J. 2006. “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”, in A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, ed., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, Oxford University Press, 2008, 376-389. [Replies to Wright’s Criticisms and offers a clear re-statement of his position.]

Millar, A. 2008. “Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge”, in A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, ed., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, Oxford University Press, 330-347. [Argues that perceptual knowledge puts us in cognitive contact with objects, as relationalists think, but denies that experience itself needs to be essentially relational for us to have perceptual knowledge. Cognitive contact consists in the exercise of our perceptual-recognitional abilities in response to perceptual experience, and this sort of contact does not require that experience be essentially relational.]

Neta, R. 2008. “In Defense of Disjunctivism”, in Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock, eds., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Responds to objections to McDowell’s argument to the effect that the only satisfactory explanation of why good cases of perception put us in a better epistemic position than bad cases is that a fact is made manifest to us in the good cases but not in the bad case.]

Pritchard, D. 2008. “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism”, in Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford University Press. [Defends a version of McDowellian disjunctivism as a way of preserving the Moorean response to skepticism.]

HALLUCINATION

Two arguments central to the disjunctivism debate are the arguments from hallucination and illusion. The argument from hallucination runs as follows. There are hallucinations. Hallucinations are cases in which we are aware of an object. As hallucinations do not have an external object, the object which we are aware of must be an internal object. Hallucinations and non-hallucinations should be accounted for in the same way (e.g. because they are subjectively indistinguishable or have the same proximate causes). So, in all cases of perceptual experience the object which we are aware of is internal. Traditionally the argument from hallucination was thought to motivate sense-data theory. It has also been taken by Meinong and the Vienna school to motivate ultra-realism. On this view, we are directly aware of an object in hallucination cases but the object does not exist. More recently the the argument has been taken (as a reductio) to motivate disjunctivist and intentionalist conceptions of experience (see e.g. Chalmers 2004 *Naïve-Realist and Quasi-Disjunctivist Replies and Tye 1995 for an overview and defenses of the intentionalist conception of experience). Smith (2002) (see *Textbooks) adopts the Meinongian strategy but only for the hallucination case. In hallucination cases we are aware of a non-existent internal object which supervenes on properties of the perceiver. In veridical perception cases we are aware of an external object which does supervene on properties of the perceiver. For a critique of Smith's views see Siegel (2006). A major problem for disjunctivists who do not treat hallucinations as involving an object is to account for their phenomenal character. Martin (2004) (see *Metaphysical Disjunctivism) is a quietist about the phenomenal character of hallucinations. He argues that we cannot say anything more substantial about it than that hallucinations are indiscriminable from veridical perceptions. Fish (2008) argues that the phenomenal effect of hallucinations derive from the phenomenal character of veridical perceptions. When a subject is unaware that she is hallucinating, she takes herself to be genuinely perceiving and hence forms a belief to the effect that she is having a veridical perception. When she is aware that she is hallucinating, she does not form a belief to the effect that she is having a veridical perception. Rather, she forms a belief to the effect that it is as if she has a veridical perception. The phenomenal effect is derived from her possession of that belief. Sturgeon (2006), Siegel (2008), and Hellie (forthcoming) criticize the disjunctivist idea that one can, or must, account for the phenomenal properties of hallucinations by appealing to their indiscriminability from veridical perceptions. Sturgeon (2006) offers a version of disjunctivism that denies that there is anything it is like to hallucinate. Hellie (2005) discusses indiscriminability more generally and relates it to the phenomenal sorites. Hellie (2007) argues that there are many candidates to be the phenomenal character of experience. Hellie (2010) develops a new notion of reflective discriminability.

Fish, W. 2008. "Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination". In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford University Press. [Argues that disjunctivists must offer different explanations of phenomenal character of good and bad cases of perception. The phenomenal character of hallucinations is derivative from the phenomenal character of veridical perceptions. When we hallucinate we judge that we are having an experience with a particular phenomenal character because we judge that the experience is veridical, and veridical experiences have a phenomenal character. Cases in which the subject is

aware that she is hallucinating are dealt with differently. In these cases the subject forms a belief to the effect that it is as her experience is veridical. The subjective feeling that it is as if she is seeing is derivative on that belief.]

Hellie, B. 2005. "Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability", *Mind* 114: 481-508. [Offers an analysis of the notion of transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability and argues that whether the inexact representation of colors violates transitivity depends on how this notion is understood.]

Hellie, B. 2007. "Factive Phenomenal Characters", *Philosophical Perspectives* 21: 259-306. [Pro-disjunctivism. Argues that there are many candidates to be the phenomenal character of experience.]

Hellie, B. 2010. "An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience", in B. Nanay, ed., *Perceiving the World*, New York: Oxford University Press. [Pro-disjunctivism. Develops a notion of reflective indiscriminability.]

Hellie, B. Forthcoming. "The 'Screening Off' Argument for Epistemic Disjunctivism", in F. Macpherson, ed., *Hallucination*, MIT Press. [Offers a critical analysis of and develops an objection to Martin's argument for the view that the phenomenal character of hallucinations consists in their being indistinguishable from certain veridical perceptions.]

Siegel, S. 2006. "Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73: 378-410. [Discussion and critique of Smith's *The Problem of Perception*.]

Siegel, S. 2008. "The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination", in Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge*. Oxford University Press. [Critical of versions of disjunctivism which attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms.]

Sturgeon, S. 2006. "Reflective Disjunctivism", *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 80: 185–216. [Reviews various objections to quietist and nonquietist versions of disjunctivism, one nonquietist version being reflective disjunctivism, the view that the phenomenal character of hallucination cases derives from their being reflectively indiscriminable from veridical perception cases. Then expresses sympathies with 'pure disjunctivism', the view that there is no such thing as bad character, there is nothing it is like to hallucinate. Introspection yields no knowledge of what bad experience is like because there is nothing it is like.]

Tye, M. 1995. *Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Tye's first book-length

defense of strong representationalism, which takes phenomenal consciousness to be representational, with respect to sensory and bodily experience. The ten problems, roughly, are: (1) ownership (only I can have my own pain), (2) phenomenology (what it's like), (3) brain mechanism (how do our brains produce phenomenology?), (4) causal role (perceptions must have a causal role), (5) modality-specificity. (We cannot obtain all the information pertaining to vision by other means), (6) zombies (zombie duplicates of ourselves who lack phenomenal consciousness are conceivable), (7) the inverted spectrum (you have a red experience, I have a green experience while looking at a ripe tomato), (9) transparency (you don't perceive properties as properties of your experience, but as properties of the object of your experience), (10) the problem of the alien leg (how to account for the fact that I feel pain as a pain in my leg, not yours). Only strong representationalism can solve all these problems.]

ILLUSION

The argument from illusion runs as follows. There are illusions. Illusions attribute properties to an object which the object does not instantiate. These properties must be instantiated in an object. As they are not instantiated in an external object, they must be instantiated in an internal object. Illusions and veridical perceptions should be accounted for in the same way. So, in all cases of perception the properties attributed are instantiated by an internal object. Like the argument from hallucination the argument from illusion was traditionally taken to motivate sense data theory. Contemporary discussions of the argument from illusion can be found in e.g. Smith (2002) (see *), Thau (2004), Brewer (2008), Byrne and Logue (2008) (see *General Overviews) and Fish (2009) (see *Textbooks). Byrne and Logue (2008) (see *General Overviews) note that disjunctivists are divided on the question of how to respond to the argument from illusion. Some treat illusions as belonging to the same category of bad cases as hallucinations (e.g. McDowell 1982 *Metaphysical Disjunctivism). Others think that they belong to the same category as veridical perceptions, as illusions are relations to external objects. Smith (2002) (see *Textbooks), for example, argues that illusions are direct acquaintances with an object in which it phenomenally appears to one that the object has a property which it doesn't have. Smith thus rejects the premise in the argument from illusions that illusions attribute properties to an object which the object does not instantiate. The various disjunctivist responses to the argument from hallucination and the argument from illusion raise the problem of how to draw a sharp ontological distinction between veridical perceptions and illusions, on the one hand, and between veridical perceptions and hallucinations, on the other. If I hallucinate a spot on the wall, does my experience qualify as a hallucination or an illusion? How should we classify experiences in which the perceiver is aware of view-point relative properties? For example, if I am looking at a tilted coin, it seems that I am aware of oval-shapedness in addition to the circular-shapedness of the coin. But the coin is not oval, it is circular. So, is my experience an illusion? These sorts of problems are addressed in Smith (2002) (see *Textbooks). A further problem arises for the epistemically motivated distinctivist who draws a sharp distinction between cases of veridical perception and cases of falsidical experience. Brogaard (2008) (see *Epistemological Disjunctivism) argues that there are plenty of cases of veridical perception which cannot count as good cases of perception either because any belief to which they give rise is accidentally true, or

because they are clear cases of hallucinations in spite of the fact that the subject is appropriately causally related to an object.

Brewer, B. 2008. "How to Account for Illusion", in F. Macpherson & A. Haddock, ed., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 168-180. [Discusses and defends the early modern empiricist insight that one can capture the subjective character of experience only by making appeal to a direct object of experience.]

Thau, M. 2004. "What is Disjunctivism?", *Philosophical Studies* 120: 193-253. [Discusses the disjunctivist reply to the argument from illusion. Argues that there are two essential steps that the disjunctivist could reject in the argument from illusion. One essential step is that from the thought that illusions are inaccurate to the thought that they have odd nonmaterial objects (e.g., sense data, mere appearances or ideas). The second essential step is that from the thought that non-veridical experiences have odd nonmaterial objects to the thought that all experiences have odd nonmaterial objects. Argues further that McDowell never states that experiences are disjunctive but only that appearances are. Then discusses Austin's reaction in *Sense and Sensibilia* to the argument from illusion.]

NAÏVE REALIST AND QUASI-DISJUNCTIVIST REPLIES

Discussions of whether a non-disjunctive version of naive realism can handle illusion and hallucination cases can be found in e.g. Smith (2002) (see *Textbooks), Johnston (2004) (see *Metaphysical Disjunctivism: Critique), and Dunn (2008). One can also block the arguments from illusion and/or hallucination by treating the differences between veridical perception and hallucination as differences at the level of Russellian content. This leads to a kind of quasi-disjunctive version of intentionalism. Defenses of quasi-disjunctive versions of intentionalism can be found in e.g. Bach (1997), Chalmers (2004), Hilbert (2004), Tye (2007, 2009), Thompson (2008) and Schellenberg (forthcoming).

Bach, K. 1997. "Searle Against the World". Ms. San Francisco State University. [Defends a version of the gappy content strategy with respect to hallucinations.]

Chalmers, D. 2004. "The Representational Character of Experience", *The Future for Philosophy*, B. Leiter, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 153-81. [Overview and defense of intentionalism. Introduces impure intentionalism to deal with problem of accounting for the shared content in perceptions via different sense modalities. According to impure intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to impure representational properties, that is, the property of representing a certain intentional content in a certain manner. When an impure representational property is instantiated,

the corresponding pure representational property is instantiated. Here a pure representational property is the property of representing a certain intentional content. It is further argued that perceptual experience has gappy or non-gappy Russellian and Fregean content. The Fregean content is the phenomenal content and supervenes on the phenomenal character of experience.]

Dunn, J. 2008. "The Obscure Act of Perception", *Philosophical Studies* 139: 367–393. [Reply to Johnston's (2004) non-disjunctive direct realist account of hallucinations.]

Hilbert, D. R. 2004. "Hallucination, Sense-Data and Direct Realism", *Philosophical Studies* 120: 185-191. [Argues that Johnston's (2004) strategy is to allow for a common object of awareness in good and bad cases of perception but then allow for additional awareness of particulars in the veridical case.]

Schellenberg, S. Forthcoming. "Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. [Defends a version of the gappy content strategy with respect to hallucinations.]

Thompson, B. J. 2008. "Representationalism and the Argument from Hallucination", *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 89: 384-412. [Defends a version of intentionalism which allows that one is directly aware of external properties in veridical perception cases but not in hallucination cases.]

Tye, M. 2007. "Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content", *Philosophical Perspectives* 21: 589-613. [Sets forth the singular (when filled) thesis about perceptual content. Veridical perceptions and hallucinations do not have a common content, as only hallucination cases have gappy content. Phenomenal character originates in a property cluster common to veridical perceptions and hallucinations. So, strong intentionalism is false, though a version of weak intentionalism is true.]

Tye, M. 2009. *Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [Defends a Russellian acquaintance account of phenomenal conscious and perception, according to which to see something, one must be conscious of it, and to be conscious of it, one must be able to mentally point to it, that is, one must be able to direct one's attention to it in a direct fashion. Tye argues that the Russellian acquaintance account enables the physicalist to solve four puzzles about consciousness without turning to the phenomenal concept strategy. Tye also defends his (2007) singular (when filled) thesis about perceptual content.]

INTROSPECTIVE DISJUNCTIVISM

Introspective disjunctivism is disjunctivism about phenomenal belief. A phenomenal belief is a belief that one has an experience with a certain kind of phenomenal property. It has long been thought that phenomenal beliefs, unlike many other beliefs, have a special epistemic status. However, it also seems plausible that one can be mistaken about the phenomenal properties of one's experiences. One way to address this problem is to adopt a form of disjunctivism about phenomenal belief. The idea is that there are cases in which one has a phenomenal belief that is partially constituted by the phenomenal property in question. So, in genuine/direct phenomenal belief cases one is directly acquainted with a phenomenal property, whereas in non-genuine/indirect phenomenal belief cases one is not directly acquainted with a phenomenal property. Versions of introspective disjunctivism have been defended by Chalmers (2003), and Macpherson (2009). Papineau's (2002) and Balog's (2009) quotational views of phenomenal concepts might end up leading to a kind of introspective disjunctivism. Horgan thinks genuine phenomenal beliefs require that the pertinent phenomenal property be actually instantiated by/in the experiencer, and that they figure as what he calls 'self-presenting modes of presentation'. A zombie, on this view, would not really have genuine phenomenal beliefs at all. Papers at least in the vicinity of discussing such matters are e.g. Graham, Horgan and Tienson (2006) and Horgan and Kriegel (2007).

Balog, K. 2009. "Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem", Ms, Department of Philosophy, Yale University.

[Proposes the quotational account of direct phenomenal concepts, according to which direct phenomenal concepts involve direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties.]

Chalmers, D. J. 2003. "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief", in Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic, ed., *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford University Press.

[Offers a disjunctive theory of phenomenal belief. Direct phenomenal beliefs involve direct phenomenal concepts which depend constitutively on the phenomenal properties they are about. Direct phenomenal beliefs are particularly interesting epistemologically, because they put us in direct cognitive contact with phenomenal properties and hence cannot be false.]

Graham, G., Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. 2006. "Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness", in M. Reicher and J. Marek (eds.), *Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium*, 2005, 191-207.

[Phenomenal beliefs require that the pertinent phenomenal property be actually instantiated by/in the experiencer, and that they figure as self-presenting modes of presentation. Also in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness* (MIT, 2006), 41-61.]

Horgan, T. and Kriegel, U. 2007. "Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We May Know It so Well?", *Philosophical Issues* 17: 123-144. [Argues that a species of self-knowledge is better than other knowledge, viz. what they call 'phenomenal

knowledge'. Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge one has of the phenomenal properties of one's own experiences. This knowledge is better than other forms of knowledge because it is composed of concepts partially constituted by the phenomenal properties in question.]

Macpherson, F. 2009. "A Disjunctivist Theory of Introspection", Ms. University of Glasgow. First delivered as a paper entitled "Disjunctivism, Self-Knowledge and Anton's Syndrome" given as an ANU RSSS Seminar, Thursday, February 28, 2008. [Discusses Anton's syndrome and zombies in relation to a disjunctive account of phenomenal belief. Argues that in the good cases of phenomenal judgment one's judgments in fact instantiate the phenomenal properties one believes one's experience instantiates, so the content of the judgment depends constitutively on the phenomenal properties in question.]

Papineau, D. 2002. *Thinking about Consciousness*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Develops a quotational-indexical account of phenomenal concepts, according to which to have a phenomenal concept of a given experience, you must be able introspectively to attend to it when you have it or recreate it in imagination.]

DISJUNCTIVISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION

More recently disjunctive theories have been developed outside the philosophy of perception and epistemology. In the philosophy of action it has been employed to address the following sort of worry about reasons for action. If an agent A acts for reason p, and p is a fact, it seems reasonable to say that A acts because p. However, agents also act on false propositions. If I see a snake, I might run because I think the snake is dangerous, even if this turns out to be false. One might now say that these bad cases show that facts are not the real reasons for action. Alternatively, one can employ a disjunctivist theory of reasons for action. One possibility is to say that reasons for actions are either facts or beliefs. This theory is discussed and rejected in Dancy 2000 and Dancy 2008. Alternatively, one can say that reasons for actions are either knowledge or belief. So, in the case where the snake really is dangerous, and my belief is justified, the reason for my action is my knowledge that the snake is dangerous. In the case where I believe the snake is dangerous but it is not, the reason for my action is my belief that the snake is dangerous. This view is advanced by Hornsby (2008). Hornsby (1997) and Ruben (2008) defend a disjunctive theory of bodily movement as either essentially involving mental states or as not essentially involving mental states. Brogaard (2009) offers a disjunctive theory of abilities as either essentially involving mental states or as not essentially involving mental states and then argues that the former, but not the latter, kind of ability is a kind of knowledge-state, viz. a knowledge-how state.

Brogaard, B. 2009. "Knowledge-How: A Unified Account", *Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action*, J. Bengson and M. Moffett ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[Proposes a disjunctive theory of abilities as either procedures that have been internalized by the agent and hence are essentially mind-involving, or bodily capacities which, if

associated with the right sort of procedural information by the agent, will put the agent in a position to achieve the relevant end. Then argues that the former kind of ability is fundamentally a knowledge-state, viz. a knowledge-how state.]

Dancy, J. 2000. *Practical Reality*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[Argues that when we act for a reason, our reasons are not mental states. What we should do is determined by what the world is like, not what we believe it is like.]

Dancy, J. 2008. "On How to Act—Disjunctively", in A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, eds., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 262-282.

[Argues against the disjunctive conception of reasons for action, according to which reasons are facts in good cases but beliefs in bad cases.]

Hornsby, J. 1997. *Simple Mindedness: A Defence of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[Defends the view that some bodily movements are not physical entities because they essentially involve mental states, whereas other bodily movements are physical entities because they do not essentially involve mental states.]

Hornsby, J. 2008. "A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons", in A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, eds., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 244-261.

[Defends a disjunctive conception of reasons for action, according to which reasons are knowledge in good cases and beliefs in bad cases.]

Ruben, D.-H. 2008. "Disjunctive Theories of Perception and Action", in A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, eds., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 227-243.

[Argues that a disjunctive theory of action to the effect that being in a state that consists in one's body moving in a certain way is to be in a state that either involves mental states or does not involve mental states avoids certain problems with causal and volitional theories of action].

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